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SUBSISTENCE DEMYSTIFIED?! 
A Note on Cusmariu's "Subsistence Demystified" 
Robert Cronin 
"Subsistence Demystified" promises to clear up our 
conceptual difficulties on an age-old philosophical 
problem which has tried the philosophical abilities of 
thinkers from Plato to Russell. Even if the title proves 
a little pretentious, we can perhaps overlook it if we are 
told something new and interesting about subsistence. And 
we are. Unfortuanately, what is new is not interesting 
and what is interesting is not new. 
The author states the problem succinctly enough. If-
there are abstract objects, do they enjoy a special mode 
of being different from the mode of being of temporal 
objects? Universals are intimated as being candidates for 
this former type of entity. The author eschews the 
alleged Platonic thesis about degrees of reality and 
Russell's distinction between existence and subsistence. 
Existence like (numerical) evenness does not admit of 
degrees; things do not more or less exist any more than 
numbers are more or less even. "The distinction between 
existence and subsistence is not any clearer than talk 
about degrees of reality" (p. 25). There is something in 
this. One does not solve a philosophical problem about 
the ontological status of a class of entities (or possible 
entities) merely by coining a term to apply to the mode of 
existence of that class. But a careful reading of the 
article shows that Cusmariu seems to commit the same sin. 
Consider his three definitions. The first, "a exists =Df 
(Ey)(y=a)" which is to say that a exists if it is 
identical with something which exists. The circularity 
aside (using the existential quantifier to define 
existence) the so-called definition is not very 
enlightening. If the author meant that as a formalization 
of "to be is to be the value of a bound variable" a 
footnote to Quine would have been in order. His second 
definition, "a subsists =Df (Ey)(y=a & (z)(Tz — > z^y))" 
(where T is the predicate 'is a temporal object'), tells 
us that something subsists if it is identical with a non-
temporal object. His third definition is, something 
'texists* if it is identical with a temporal object, "a. 
texists =Df (Ey)(Ty & y=a)." To my knowldege, no 
philosopher ever thought that any abstract objects like 
universals, numbers, sets, propositions, etc. were 
temporal. But the problem of subsistence is precisely the 
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problem of the ontological status of such entities. 
Nothing is gained by telling us that they are non-
temporal. We have always known what they were not. What 
we want to know is what they are, if anything. The title 
of the article promises to tell us something about 
subsistence- Instead, it tells us that subsistence is 
non-temporal existence. Is this not cotton candy when the 
menu promised steak? What has the author said about 
subsistence? He tells us that it entails existence, but 
of existence he says that it might be said that existence 
is a pure and simple property. If it is simple it is not 
analyzable. Thus he cannot, nor does he try to say 
anything about existence. And he tells us nothing about 
non-temporality. So his "demystification of subsistence" 
consists in his giving it two characteristics neither one 
of which he says anything about. He then goes on to say 
that now "we can understand the Platonic intuition (what I 
would call Plato's deduction) that universals and 
individuals have different modes of being without implying 
that there is more than one fundamental concept of 
existence" (p. 27). But the problem of subsistence is 
precisely the problem of the mode of being of things like 
universals. What we want to know are the differentia 
between the two modes of being and what are the 
similarities. Cusmariu tells us that the differentia is 
non-temporality, which we knew over two thousand years 
ago, and that the similarity is that they share a common 
simple "property," existence (which being simple has no 
sense only a reference), about which he can say nothing. 
If we adopt Cusmariu's "philosophical method" there is 
no end to the philosophical problems we can dissolve. We 
can solve the mind-body problem by simply saying that 
mental entities and physical entities both have some 
simple unanalyzable property. It is just that they enjoy 
different modes of being. When asked about this 
unanalyzable property we simply say that something has it 
if it is identical with something which has it and that it 
does not admit of degrees. But the mind-body problem is 
precisely, "What are the differentia between mental 
entities and physical entities?". Cusmariu criticizes 
Russell for inventing a term to "solve" a philosophical 
problem. Russell had a pretty good idea of what it meant 
to say that a temporal object existed and there seemed to 
be no way to avoid the conclusion that the universal 
"similarity" in some sense exists. So as not to confuse 
the issue Russell did not want to use the same term, 
"existence," to apply to such a radically different kind 
of entity. So in the cause of clarity he adopts the use 
of the term "subsistence." Cusmariu takes the old term, 
"existence," and applies it equivocally to both kinds of 
entities, without telling us what it is both entities are 
said to have in common (because it is an unanalyzable 
simple). He then invents a new word, "texists," to take 
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the place of the old one, "exists." And that is simply 
the old philosophical shell game. 
It might be thought that the value of the paper could 
be saved with a change in title. If no new or interesting 
differentia between abstract objects and temporal objects 
are offered in virtue of which we can understand 
"subsistence," perhaps the value of the paper lies in 
providing us with a simple notion of existence. But it 
does not do that either. The analysis of existence does 
not allow us to distinguish fictional objects, which I 
assume do not exist, from non-fictional ones. The paper 
does not offer us any differentia between existence and 
non-existence. Suppose someone says that the planet 
Krypton exists. We say, "but where?" He says, "it is a 
non-temporal object, a special kind of planet." We say, 
"In virtue of what does it exist?" He says, "In virtue of 
this simple, pure property existence. I admit it doesn't 
texist, but lots of things don't texist, but do exist." 
To which we say, "But how do we decide whether something 
exists or even if it is meaningful to say it exists?" To 
which he says "That's a different problem." 
195 
NOTES 
•^Arnold Cusmariu, "Subsistence 
Auslegung, VI, No. 1, (1978), pp. 24-27. 
Demystified," 
